GATTing the Greens: Not Just Greening the GATT by Esty, Daniel C
GATTing the Greens 
Not Just Greening the GATT 
Daniel C. Esty 
Until recently, trade policymakers and 
environmental officials worked on sepa 
rate tracks, rarely perceiving their paths as 
intersecting. Now that environmental pro 
tection has become a central issue on the 
public agenda, trade and environmental 
policies seem deeply intertwined and in 
some cases badly tangled. Environmental 
ists are calling the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (gatt) outdated or 
worse and are demanding a "greening" of 
the gatt to reflect environmental con 
cerns. Trade experts have responded with 
a 
sharp defense of the international trade 
regime and have expressed fear that fur 
ther progress toward free trade will be 
undermined by protectionism in the guise 
of environmentalism. 
The battle lines between trade and 
environmental policymakers need not 
become entrenched. Both camps defend 
principles that foster long-term security 
and prosperity, deter irresponsible shift 
ing of costs to other nations or genera 
tions, and face a constant threat of ero 
sion from special interests. Much of the 
discussion to date has focused on possible 
legal refinements to the gatt to build 
environmental 
sensitivity into the inter 
national trading system. But creating a 
new parallel international regime 
designed to defend the environment as a 
necessary element of a prosperous global 
economy and to coordinate policies with 
the gatt would offer the prospect of a 
broader peace between the trade and 
environmental communities. Like gatt, 
it would provide a bulwark against 
domestic political pressures that under 
mine long-term thinking and serve as an 
honest broker for the economic future, 
allocating costs, benefits and responsibili 
ties in transnational disputes. In sum, 
instead of just "greening" the gatt, we 
should "gatt" the greens. 
START WITH A PILLAR 
gatt is a central pillar of the post-World 
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War II international order. Its rules, 
norms and dispute settlement procedures 
are designed to prevent governments 
from adopting shortsighted, "beggar 
thy-neighbor" policies that limit imports 
and promote exports to establish a com 
petitive advantage at the expense of other 
countries. Such policies invite retaliatory 
actions by others and lead to a downward 
spiral into global economic chaos, as 
occurred in the 1930s in the wake of the 
Smoot-Hawley tariffs. Despite the mutu 
ally destructive nature of such policies, 
governments risk slipping into protec 
tionism because politicians tend to 
respond to the loud voices of organized 
special interests who benefit from closed 
markets rather than to the quiet require 
ments of the general welfare. 
The architects of the Bretton Woods 
economic order recognized this danger 
of political failure and, with the lessons 
of the Great Depression and World War 
II fresh in their minds, set up the gatt 
as a government-to-government con 
tract to 
safeguard an open world market. 
By enshrining the principles of liberal 
trade in an international regime, the cre 
ators of the gatt elevated the commit 
ment to freer trade to a nearly 
constitutional level, thereby limiting the 
power of governments around the world 
(and legislatures in particular) to give in 
to the pleadings of domestic special 
interests 
seeking to hide from the rigors 
of the global marketplace. 
MORE THAN A PASSING RESEMBLANCE 
No 
comparable system exists to protect 
environmental values and policies against 
a similar defect in our system of 
interest-group democracy. Governments 
rarely require polluters to pay fully for the 
environmental damage they cause. Like 
the economic losses from protectionism, 
the costs of environmental degradation 
are 
spread widely across society, making 
it difficult to organize those affected. 
The existence of threshold effects, 
time lags between emissions and detec 
tion of environmental problems, and 
sometimes substantial scientific uncer 
tainties over the source, scope and mag 
nitude of ecological damage makes the 
harm from environmental degradation 
and the benefits of pollution control easy 
to dismiss as too distant or speculative. 
Moreover, environmental issues often 
present classic examples of the "tragedy 
of the commons," in which harmful 
actions by one individual or a small num 
ber of people will have no noticeable 
effect on a public resource, but the same 
behavior from larger numbers destroys 
the resource. These characteristics of 
environmental issues leave governments 
with a nearly irresistible temptation to 
ignore pollution problems and let the 
costs of environmental 
neglect fall onto 
the ultimate inactive and unorganized 
interest group?generations yet unborn. 
Global environmental issues offer the 
additional opportunity, as in the trade 
context, to transfer burdens to foreigners. 
In dealing with problems such as climate 
change, where the pollution from one 
country spreads across the entire planet, 
governments recognize that costly emis 
sion controls on domestic industries (the 
benefit of which redounds largely to oth 
ers around the world) cannot be justified 
using the relevant political calculus (i.e., 
domestic costs versus domestic benefits) 
and might disadvantage their producers in 
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international competition with companies 
whose governments require less spending 
on pollution abatement. There exists a 
tendency to engage in damaging, beggar 
thy-neighbor environmental behavior dri 
ven by competitive pressures?the same 
phenomenon that, in the trade context, 
led the "wise men" directing U.S. postwar 
foreign policy to establish the gatt. 
Today, the world needs GATT-like rules of 
mutual economic forbearance to protect 
the environment. 
AFTER RIO: YES, WE HAVE NO CHAOS 
Confusion and incoherence characterize 
the current management of international 
environmental affairs, as a dozen different 
U.N. agencies, the secretariats to various 
environmental treaties and conventions, 
the World Bank, regional political groups, 
and the world s 180 countries acting indi 
vidually try to cope with the planet's envi 
ronmental problems. 
The U.N. Environment Programme, 
for example, has limited responsibility, 
financing and political support and 
therefore cannot play a coordinating role. 
The institutional legacy of the Earth 
Summit?the Commission on Sustain 
able Development?suffers from the 
same defects and is further hobbled by an 
unfocused mission. Its road map is 
Agenda 21, a 1,000-page compendium of 
environmental concerns and needs. 
Even the international organizations 
with established structures and resources, 
such as the World Bank's Global Envi 
ronmental Facility, have neither the abili 
ty to manage issues comprehensively nor 
the authority to serve as an honest broker 
to settle disputes. With no single organi 
zation possessing a broad or strong 
enough mandate to coordinate environ 
mental efforts, the response to the plan 
et's 
ecological problems will remain 
unfocused, ineffective, and insufficient. 
GREEN VERSUS GATT 
The lack of an Institutional Environmen 
tal Organization to protect environmen 
tal values the way the gatt guards free 
trade principles lies at the heart of the 
antagonism between trade and environ 
mental interests. Although never pure in 
its focus and now encumbered by 50 years 
of compromises designed to maintain 
reciprocal benefits among the parties to 
the agreement, the gatt establishes 
parameters for behavior in the interna 
tional trading system and defends an 
open (or at least relatively open) global 
marketplace against encroachments. 
gatt's perceived singular mission and 
relative success makes environmentalists 
both angry and envious. They see the 
gatt as insular, rigid and inpenetrable. 
But they also recognize the gatt's 
efficacy, which is in part a function of its 
narrowly tailored mission and ability to 
shield itself from political forces advanc 
ing other priorities. Thus, while 
denouncing the gatt, environmentalists 
admire its power and would like to 
remold it to serve 
"green" purposes. 
Concern in the environmental com 
munity over the negative effects of free 
trade began to heat up in 1990 with the 
announcement of plans for a North 
American Free Trade Agreement, which 
eco-skeptics argued would allow Mexico 
to become a 
"pollution haven" and would 
undermine higher U.S. environmental 
standards. In 1991 this discontent boiled 
over when a gatt dispute settlement 
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panel appeared to elevate trade obliga 
tions above environmental protection 
efforts by declaring the United States to 
be in violation of its gatt obligations for 
instituting an import ban on Mexican 
tuna caught using nets that killed large 
numbers of dolphins. In the face of the 
perceived hostility of free trade to ecolog 
ical interests, some environmentalists 
launched an all-out attack on the gatt. 




advertisements under the headline "Sab 
otage," free-trade critics painted an 
unflattering portrait of the gatt as a 
secretive, international conspiracy of 
faceless bureaucrats in Geneva 
carrying 
out sneak attacks on democracy and 
American 
sovereignty. 
In truth, the gatt is not hostile to 
the environment but agnostic. In 
defense of its environmental posture, 
the gatt 
recently issued a report that 
suggests, among other things, that trade 
liberalization contributes to environ 
mental protection by improving the 
efficiency of resource use and raising 
incomes, making possible increased 
expenditures on the environment, gatt 
officials further argue that using trade 
threats or sanctions is not a cost-effec 
tive or "first best" way to obtain compli 
ance with environmental agreements or 
promote environmental policy goals. 
They insist that the adoption of proper 
environmental policies such as the "pol 
luter pays" principle?which requires 
pollution costs to be internalized in the 
prices producers and consumers see? 
can ensure that trade liberalization also 
results in environmental gains. 
It is here that the debate between the 
trade and environmental communities 
breaks down. Economic growth does not 
necessarily translate into more resources 
for environmental protection. More sig 
nificantly, first best environmental poli 
cies (e.g., taxing pollution) are frequently 
politically unachievable. Nevertheless, 
trade theorists have become consumed 
with policy proposals to make trade and 
environment policies mutually support 
ive by means of economically "appropri 
ate" environmental policies, which 
would force polluters to pay for the dam 
age they cause. But their relative disin 
terest in the real-world political 
difficulty of getting such measures 
adopted casts doubt on the seriousness 
of their commitment to incorporating 
environmental concerns into trade policy 
making. Their inattention to the politi 
cal failure that stymies movement 
toward 
economically sound environmen 
tal policies seems particularly ironic, 
since the gatt was created because gov 
ernments left to their own devices find it 
politically nearly impossible to maintain 
"appropriate" trade policies. 
Environmentalists, while acknowledg 
ing the universal currency of market 
incentives, accepting the need to inter 
nalize pollution costs and even conceding 
the value of proper resource pricing as a 
way to reconcile trade and environmental 
interests, have become fixated on chang 
ing the rules and procedures of the 
gatt. As a result, they have largely 
failed to consider the possibility that 
restructuring environmental policy 
mechanisms offers a more sound basis for 
protecting environmental values. 
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SUCCEEDING WHERE OTHERS FAIL 
As the gatt built on a few central con 
cepts such as nondiscrimination, negotia 
tions to establish an International 
Environmental Organization (ieo) might 
initially focus on defining general envi 
ronmental principles to guide the world 
community. For example, universal 
acceptance and application of the pol 
luter-pays principle?forcing govern 
ments, industry and individuals alike to 
bear the full costs of the environmental 
burdens they impose on society?would 
create powerful incentives for pollution 
prevention and environmental care, con 
sistent with the long-term interest of the 
public in a healthy environment and 
ongoing economic growth. Over time, an 
ieo might develop a broader body of 
international environmental law and a 
cohesive set of rules, norms, methodolo 
gies and procedures for countries to fol 
low in carrying out a shared commitment 
to the protection of the planet. 
Whether or not an ieo is created, the 
rules and procedures of international 
trade will have to be updated to reflect 
environmental concerns. The gatt's tra 
ditional bar against "extraterritorial" 
trade restrictions designed to encourage 
other nations to adopt environmentally 
sound production processes needs to be 
amended, and countries invoking trade 
measures designed to uphold interna 
tional environmental agreements must 
not be subject to gatt countermands. In 
addition, the policy context of gatt deci 
sions needs to be broadened by the 
undertaking of environmental analyses 
prior to trade negotiations and by allow 
ing environmental groups and other non 
government organizations to submit 
views on issues under gatt review or 
which are the subject of dispute settle 
ment procedures. In the absence of an 
ieo, of course, the policy void gatt must 
fill will be greater, requiring more sub 
stantial changes in the gatt to inculcate 
environmental values and permit it to rec 
oncile internally competing trade and 
environmental goals. 
Creating an ieo and multilateral rules 
to promote the economic and ecological 
sustainability of life might allow the com 
munity of nations to adopt together the 
optimal environmental policies they can 
not enact alone. Clarifying environmental 
requirements and dispute settlement pro 
cedures, for example, would reassure the 
trade and business communities, which 
dislike uncertainty and fear that future 
trade liberalization will be undermined by 
efforts to recast the gatt as an environ 
mental institution. Whether a new envi 
ronmental organization is created or the 
gatt is amended, reconciliation between 
the trade and environmental communities 
depends on a realignment of international 
relations to accommodate the environ 
ment as a critical issue of post-Cold War 
foreign affairs. 
In anticipation of next year's 50th 
anniversary of the Bretton Woods Con 
ference, a number of major reviews of the 
international organizations set up to 
manage world affairs in the wake of 
World War II are underway. Initiatives to 
update this institutional structure offer 
the current world leaders a chance to look 
forward, establish mechanisms to address 
21st-century global challenges and 
respond to today's "political failures" 
before they devolve into crises.? 
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